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CASES NOTED
CHATTEL MORTGAGES - FUTURE ADVANCES - EFFECT OF
"DRAGNET" CLAUSE ON REDEMPTION BY ASSIGNEE
OF MORTGAGOR
Defendant, a Georgia bank, acquired bills of sale for certain motor
vehicles as security for a loan to a debtor. Each bill of sale contained a
"dragnet" clause stating that it was given not only as security for the loan
but in addition as security for " . . . any and all other indebtedness now due
by me to said bank or hereafter incurred by me,' whether directly or indirectly, as principal, endorser, guarantor, or otherwise." The plaintiff, a
Florida corporation, purchased these vehicles from the debtor subject to the
amount then due on the bank loan and tendered this amount to the bank
-to secure clear title. After delaying acceptance, the defendant bank procured a contingent assignment of an unsecured debt owed by the debtor
to a fourth party and refused to cancel its bills of sale until the assigned
obligation was paid. The plaintiff brings an equitable action for construction of the bills of sale and injunctive relief. Held, for defendant on the
basis of the comprehensive nature of the "dragnet" clause and in support of
the courts' policy of jealously safeguarding contractual rights. Rose City
Foods v. Bank of Thomas County, 62 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. 1950).
The pledge of title deeds as security for future advances as well as for
present loans was not generally accepted as valid in this country until the
early part of the last century.2 But the validity of these so-called "dragnet"
clauses in mortgages to secure future advances has not been questioned in
4
recent years,3 although many courts still tend to regard them with suspicion.
'Ihus, even though the clause purports to include within the security of the
lien all subsequent debts of the mortgagor to the mortgagee, it has been
1. Italics supplied by the writer,
2. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U.S. 1805); 3

GLENN MoRTCACEs

§ 399

(1943).
3. See New Orleans National Banking Ass'n v. LeBreton, 120 U.S. 765, 770 (1886);
Lawrence v. Tucker, 23 How. 14, 18 (U.S. 1859); United States v. Hooe, supra note 2, at
89; Peacock, Hunt & \Vest Co. v. Thaggard, 128 Fed. 1005, 1009 (C.C.S.D. Fla.),
aff'd mer., 129 Fed. 1005 (5th Cir. 1904); Griffith v. State Mutual Building & Loan
Ass'n, 51 P.2d 246, 248 (Ariz. 1935); Cray v. Brasee, 14 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689-690 (Sup,
Ct. 1939); Batten v. jurist, 306 Pa. 64, 69, 158 At. 557, 559 (1932); see 4 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

§

1197 (5th ed. 1941).

4. See Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 377, 21 S.W.2d 419, 421 (1929), "Mortgages
of this character have been denominated 'Anaconda mortgages' and are well named thus,
as by their broad and general terms they enwrap the unsuspecting debtor in the folds of
indebtedness embraced and secured in the mortgage which he did not contemplate, and
to extend them further than has already been done would, in our opinion, be dangerous
and unwise"; First v. Byrne, 238 Iowa 712, 28 N.W.2d 509, 511 (1947); Corn Belt Say.
Bank v. Kriz, 207 Iowa 11, 18, 219 N.W. 503, 506 (1928).
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held not to include an indirect indebtedness, 5 an independent indebtedness,
a judgment,7 or a debt for which the mortgagor was liable as suretys or
indorserY To a large extent, in construing these clauses as to inclusiveness,
the courts attempt to determine the intentions of the parties by the wording
of the clauses taken in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 10 Even
where the wording of the clause is very comprehensive and unambiguous,
however, the import of many decisions has been to exclude from its provisions those obligations of the mortgagor which are held not to have been
within the contemplation of the original parties at the time of the transaction," or which did not arise directly out of dealings between them, 12 or
13
which were not of the same nature as those described in the mortgage.
The conflict concerning this type of clause usually arises between the
mortgagee and a third party to whom the property has been transferred or
to whose lien it has been subjected. Where the making of advances to the
mortgagor or acquisition of other indebtedness of the mortgagor is optional
with the mortgagee 4 many courts feel that the mortgagee's priority of lien
should depend on whether or not he had notice of the subsequent encumbrance.' A militant minority still follows the doctrine laid down by Justice
5. Strong Hardware Co. v. Gonyow, 105 Vt. 415, 168 Atl. 547 (1933).
6. Belton v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank & Trust Co., 186 N.C. 614, 120 S.E.
220 (1923).
7. Martin v. Holbrooks, 55 Ark. 569, 18 SAX'. 1046 (1892); Poulter v. Weatherford
Hardware Co., 266 S.W. 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
8. Cotton v. First Nat. Bank of Opp, 228 Ala. 311, 153 So. 225 (1934); Lightle v.
Rotenberry, 166 Ark. 337, 266 S.W. 297 (1924).
9. Moran v. Gardemeyer, 86 Cal. 96, 23 Pac. 6 (1889). Contra Commercial Bank
v. Weinberg, 70 Hun. 597, 25 N.Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
10. Monroe County Bank v. Qualls, 220 Ala. 499, 125 So. 615 (1929); Hollywood
State Bank v. Cook, 221 P.2d 988 (Cal. 1950); Bank of Cedartown v. Holloway-Smith
Co., 146 Ga. 700, 92 S.E. 213 (1917); Wright v- Voorhees, 131 Iowa 408, 108 N.W. 758
(1906); Lamoille County Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 Atl. 1002
(1916 ; see Republic National Bank of Dallas v.Cesmer, 187 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945); Poulter v. Weatherford Hardware Co., supra note 7.
11. Wright v. Voorhees, supra note 10 at 411, 108 NW. at 759; Rutherford v.
Edward L. Eyre Co., 174 Ore. 162, 148 P.2d 530, 535 (1944); Republic National Bank
of Dallas v. Zesmer, supra note 10 at 229,
12. Berger v. Fuller, supra note 4; First National Bank of Jackson v. Combs, 208 Ky.
763, 271 S.W. 1077 (1925); Lashbrooks v. Hatheway, 52 Mich. 124, 17 N.W. 723
(1883); see Peacock, Hunt & West Co. v. Thaggard, supra note 3 at 1009; Walker v.
Whitmore, 165 Ark. 276, 280, 262 SAX. 678, 679 (1924).
13. Lightle v. Rotenbcrrv, sipra note 8; Martin v. Holbrooks, supra note 7.
14. See Shirras v. Caig, 7 Cranch 34, 41 (U.S. 1812), "But it is evident that some
bounds ought to be set to this mode of mortgaging on contingencies, especially when the
mortgagee retains an absolute unrestrained option whether the mortgagor shall or shall
not be his debtor; when he is under no legal or moral obligation to make or assume a
liability on his behalf."
15. Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 52 F. Supp. 717 (D.C. Okl. 1944), rev'd
on other grounds, 152 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1945);
Davis v. Carlisle, 142 Fed. 106 (8th Cir. 1905); see Reidy v. Collins 134 Cal. App. 713,
723, 26 P.2d 712, 716 (1933); Chartz v. Cardelli, 52 Nev. 1, 8, 279 Pac. 761, 763 (1929);
Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 54, 33 N.E. 73S, 737 (1893); Catskill Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Saxe, 175 Misc. 501, 502, 24 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (Sup. Ct. 1940); see 1 WILTSIE,
MORTCAGE FoRECLOSURIe § 254 (5th ed. 1939); 1 JoNES, MORTGAGES §§ 452, 453 (8th

ed. 1928).
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Campbell in the leading case of Witczinski v. Everman'6 that any indebtedness of the mortgagor acquired b the mortgagee either before or after notice
of the secondary lien should take priority over such secondary lien.' 7 The
rationale is that such a clause is adequate per se to put a transferee or junior
creditor on notice of the frailty of his lien,' especially where the in)strument
containing the "dragnet" clause has been recorded.'
There is strong feeling, however, against the view that the scope of the "dragnet" clause should
be judicially extended to cover the deliberate purchase of outstanding unrelated obligations of the mortgagor for the express purpose of bringing them
within the mortgage security, 20 unless this is the clear and expressed intention
of the parties.2 ' Moreover, many of those favoring the Witczinski view hold
that actual notice by the subsequent encumbrancer to the mortgagee as
opposed to mere recordation or constructive notice will prevent effective
advances or indebtedness from accruing to the prejudice of the secondary
22
lien.
In the instant case, the refusal of the defendant mortgagee2 3 to accept
the plaintiff's tender of the amount then due under the bills of sale was
based on an obvious pretext. After receiving actual notice of the transfer
of the mortgaged cars to the plaintiff, the defendant assumed the disputed
debt in consideration for its promise to credit the unsecured debtor's account
only when and if collection was made, and asserted that this was secured
under the provisions of the quoted "dragnet" clause. Georgia has consistently followed the Witczinski case which its supreme court quoted with
approval fairly recently.24 rhe court in the instant case cited three Georgia
cases as authority. 26 In Hurst v.Flynn-Harris-BullardCo., the mortgagor
16. 51 Miss. 841 (1876); but see North v. J. WV. McClintock, Inc., 44 S.W.2d
412, 414 (Miss. 1950), which seems to overrule the Witezinski case.

17. Cattle Raisers' Loan Co. v. First National Bank of Decatur, 54 SAV.2d 857
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932); First National Sank v. Zarafonetis, 15 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929); Poole v. Cage, 214 S.W. 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
18. Witczinski v. Everman, subra note 16; see Zachry v. Industrial Loan & Investment Co., 182 Ga. 738, 747, 186 S.E. 832, 838 (1936); Hurst v. Flynn-llarris-Bullard
Co., 166 Ga. 480, 484, 143 S.E. 503, 506 (1928); Poole v. Cage, supra note 17 at 502.
19, See Peacock, Hunt & West Co. v. Thaggard, supra note 3 at 1010; Atkinson v.
Foote, 44 Cal. App. 149, 159-160, 186 Pac. 831, 837 (1919); Bullard v.Fender, 140
Fla. 448, 459-461, 192 So. 167, 171-172 (1939); see 4 POMEROY, op. Cit. supra note 3,
§§ 1198, 1199.
20. Provident Mutual Building Loan Ass'n v,Shaffer, 2 Cal. App. 216, 83 Pac.
274 (1905); Moran v.Gardemeyer, supra note 9.
21. See Lashbrooks v. Hatheway, supra note 12 at 129, 17 N.W. at 726; Strong
Hardware Co. v.Gonyow, suPra note 5,168 Atd. at 548.
22. Atkinson v.Foote, supra note 19; Rochester Lumber Co. v.Dygert, 136 Misc.
292, 240 N.Y. Supp. 580 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Hall v.Williamson Grocery Co., 69 W. Va.
671, 72 S.E. 780 (1911); see citations 138 A.L.R. 566, 579-582.
23. Georgia is a "title state" in which a bill of sale may be executed to secure a debt
but actually passes no title, being merely in the nature of an equitable mortgage. GA.
STAT. AN. § 67-101 (1933); Merchants' and Mechanics' Bank v.Beard, 162 Ga.446, 134
S.E. 107 (1926).
24. See Zachary v.Industrial Loan & Investment Co., supra note 18 at 747, 186 S.F.
at 838.
25. Hurst v.Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co., suira note 18; Leffler Co. v.Lane, 146 Ga.
741, 92 S.F. 214 (1917); McClure v.Smith, 115 Ga. 709, 42 S.E. 53 (1902).
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conveyed a warranty deed to the plaintiff without notification to the mortgagee who held a security deed containing a "dragnet" clause on the same
property, and then died insolvent and considerably in debt to the mortgagee
as a result of business transactions between them. Leffler Co. v. Lane is
concerned with an attempt by the plaintiff mortgagee to bring within the
scope of the "dragnet" clause the indebtedness to itself of a partnership of
which the mortgagor subsequently became a member, the indebtedness
having arisen in the course of business between the partnership and the
mortgagee. The third case, McClure v. Smith, did not involve a "dragnet"
clause, but dealt instead with the extension of the security for one loan to
cover another loan by an apparent agreement of the parties. Disregarding
the McClure case, the Hurst and Leffler cases are readily distinguishable
from the instant case by the'fact that the indebtedness in question arose out
of transactions between the parties, and could therefore be assumed to have
been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution
of the mortgage containing the controversial clause. The Hurst case is
further distinguishable by the fact that the mortgagee had no notice of the
subsequent conveyance of the warranty deed. In that case, while recognizing
that substantial authority was opposed to its views, 26 the court nevertheless
felt itself bound by the previous Georgia decisions.27 In several other fairly
recent Georgia cases 28 not cited in the instant case where "dragnet" clauses
were broadly construed, the additional indebtedness also arose from transactions between the original parties to the mortgage.
It would seem, therefore, that in the instant case the Georgia Supreme
Court has carried the broad construction of "dragnet" clauses rather far in
favor of the mortgagee. It is submitted that a court sitting in equity should
feel less bound by the strict meaning of contractural verbiage than a court
of law and perhaps more influenced by the intention of the parties and the
customs of the business community with regard to similar transactions, in
order to render truly equitable decisions.
CIVIL PROCEDURE - ABATEMENT FOR FAILURE TO
MAKE PROPER SUBSTITUTION
The plaintiff, widow of a naval officer, procured judgment against Rear
Admiral Buck, Paymaster General of the Navy, requiring payment of widow's
gratuity.1 After judgment was entered, W. A. Buck was succeeded in office
26. Hurst v. Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co., supra note 18 at 483, 166 S.E at 505, citing
annotation to Ann. Gas. 1913C 552, 556 to the effect that advances made after notice of
the subsequent liens do not have priority over such liens by the weight of authority.
27. Ibid.
28. Zachry v. Industrial Loan & Investment Co., supra note 18; Bank of Cedartown
v. Holloway-Smith Co., sura note 10; Dudley v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 60 Ga.
App. 240, 2 S.E.2d 907 (1939); Albany Loan & Finance Co. v. 'ift, 43 Ga. App. 789,
160 S.E. 661 (1931).
1.41 STAT. 812, 824 (1920), as amended 34 U.S.C. § 943 (Supp. 1949).

